Reply: This is verso good objection. However, the difference between first-order and higher-order relations is relevant here. Traditionally, similarity relations such as quantita and y are the same color have been represented, mediante the way indicated sopra the objection, as higher-order relations involving identities between higher order objects (properties). Yet this treatment may not be inevitable. Mediante Deutsch (1997), an attempt is made onesto treat similarity relations of the form ‘\(x\) and \(y\) are the same \(F\)’ (where \(F\) is adjectival) as primitive, first-order, purely logical relations (see also Williamson 1988). If successful, per first-order treatment of similarity would spettacolo that the impression that identity is prior sicuro equivalence is merely verso misimpression – due preciso the assumption that the usual higher-order account of similarity relations is the only option.
Objection 6: If on day 3, \(c’ = s_2\), as the text asserts, then by NI, the same is true on day 2. But the text also asserts that on day 2, \(c = s_2\); yet \(c \ne c’\). This is incoherent.
Objection 7: The notion of divisee identity is incoherent: “If a cat and one of its proper parts are one and the same cat, what is the mass of that one cat?” (Burke 1994)
Reply: Young Oscar and Old Oscar are the same dog, but it makes niente affatto sense esatto ask: “What is the mass of that one dog.” Given the possibility of change, identical objects may differ sopra mass. On the incomplete identity account, that means that distinct logical objects that are the same \(F\) may differ mediante mass – and may differ with respect onesto a host of other properties as well. Continue reading “It does seem sicuro spettacolo, as the objector says, that identity is logically prior preciso ordinary similarity relations”